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This study investigates the extent to which inspectors perceive
government transparency as impacting regulatory performance. It
theorizes that when inspectors perceive an increase in transpar-
ency, they find that the perceived relational distance between
themselves and their inspectees rises and this, subsequently,
increases regulatory performance. The findings from a survey
among Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority
inspectors (n = 466) confirm that inspectors view an increase in
transparency as enhancing regulatory performance. This study fur-
ther investigates this mechanism by comparing two divisions with
different levels of factual relational distance (i.e., frequency of
inspector–inspectee interactions). The findings reveal that only in
the division with small factual relational distance does perceived
relational distance mediate the effect of transparency on regulatory
performance. More specifically, in divisions with small factual rela-
tional distance, more perceived transparency increases perceived
relational distance; this in turn, increases perceived regulatory
performance.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Government transparency is commonly understood to contribute to better governance in general (Hood 2007) and
to improving regulation in particular (Meijer and Homburg 2009; Van Erp 2011; Van Dooren and Van de Walle
2016). The external pressure that develops when governments make information public about the compliance of
inspectees such as business owners is assumed to help governments in executing their task of ensuring and improv-
ing the compliance of inspectees (Van Dooren and Van de Walle 2016). Encouraging inspectees' compliance also
implies that the public sector itself performs better, in the sense of its effectiveness in ensuring compliance with pub-
lic rules and regulations. However, empirical evidence to support this assumption is scarce and mixed (see Meijer and
Homburg 2009; Im et al. 2013; Porumbescu 2017). The actual effect of government transparency on regulatory per-
formance, therefore, remains unclear.
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Regulatory performance depends, to a large extent, on the ways inspectors interact with inspectees during
face-to-face encounters (Hood et al. 1999; Boyne et al. 2002; Baldwin et al. 2012). During these encounters,
inspectors interact and form relationships with inspectees through often-repeated interactions. The relational dis-
tance between inspector and inspectee can have important implications for regulatory performance. An intimate
and cooperate relationship may foster inspectees' compliance (see Ayres and Braithwaite 1994; Pautz 2009; Bald-
win et al. 2012; Pautz and Wamsley 2012; Etienne 2013), but it can also result in the ‘capture’ of inspectors. An
inspector's position will be weakened because s/he gets too close to the businesses s/he regulates and, in turn,
gets captured (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; James 2000; Ashworth et al. 2002). Government transparency inter-
feres with this street-level relationship because the behaviour of both inspectees and inspectors becomes visible
(see Winter 2003; Etienne 2014; de Boer et al. 2018) to all stakeholders in the public sphere, making it, in turn, less
intimate (see Black 2010).
Transparency research has barely addressed this effect on the relational distance between inspector and inspec-
tee at the street level, nor the implications for inspectors' perceptions of regulatory performance (see Meijer and
Homburg 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017; Porumbescu 2017). There is, thus, a lack of research on government
transparency and regulatory performance in which inspectors' perceptions are put at the centre—even though they
are crucial actors in regulatory governance (see de Boer et al. 2018). This study sets out to contribute empirical evi-
dence to the debate on government transparency and regulatory performance by answering the question: To what
extent do inspectors perceive government transparency as impacting regulatory performance? It is hypothesized that
this effect can be explained by the perceived relational distance between inspector and inspectee.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework of government transpar-
ency, regulatory performance, and relational distance between inspector and inspectee is highlighted. Second, the
method is discussed, followed by the results of a survey (n = 466) among Dutch inspectors from the Netherlands
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Third, a concluding section summarizes the main points and
provides a discussion on the implications for public administration and management scholarship, as well as policy
implementation.
2 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EXPECTATIONS
This section theoretically explores the main concepts and their interrelations. It discusses the independent variable
of government transparency, the dependent variable regulatory performance, and the mediating variable relational
distance between inspector and inspectee.
Governments are increasingly making information transparent about their own and inspectees' regulatory
performance (see Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012; Van Dooren and Van de Walle 2016; de Boer et al. 2018).
Government transparency has been defined in many ways. Cucciniello et al. (2017) emphasize that these defini-
tions often address the availability of information about decision-making processes such as budgetary matters,
about operational aspects, or about the performance of governmental bodies. Government transparency
enables inward observability. Inward observability allows stakeholders to monitor governmental bodies' internal
workings, for example regulators' activities and decision-making (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2012; Grimmelik-
huijsen et al. 2013). Stakeholders will be able to monitor and make judgements about whether or not regulators
are performing well because regulators make the level of compliance by inspectees transparent. Therefore, gov-
ernment transparency is defined as ‘the availability of information about an organization or actor allowing exter-
nal stakeholders to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organization’ (Grimmelikhuijsen 2012,
p. 55). For instance, when regulators disclose how restaurants are performing concerning hygiene rules and reg-
ulations, this allows citizens to observe not only the performance of specific restaurants but also the perfor-
mance of regulators; if restaurants fail to comply with hygiene regulations, the regulator has failed to enforce
those rules.
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Government transparency can vary concerning the amount and type of information disclosed. Regulators must
make choices about the amount of performance information they disclose, and this varies across regulators. It is
important to understand these variations, because the greater the amount of information made public, the more visi-
ble the performance of regulators, and, in turn, the greater the inward observability. The amount of regulatory perfor-
mance information can be understood to vary along three dimensions (Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; Douglas and Meijer
2016): completeness, colour, and usability.
First, governments vary in the completeness of performance information made available to stakeholders
(Grimmelikhuijsen 2012). Some may disclose only basic information, lacking details, whereas others disclose elaborate
quantitative and qualitative data (Douglas and Meijer 2016). To illustrate, governments may translate the perfor-
mance of inspectees into a smiley system. They may indicate good or bad performance by displaying a happy or a
sad smiley (Meijer and Homburg 2009), or make full datasets transparent that include all sanctions any inspectee has
received over a certain period of time.
Second, governments must decide about the colour of performance information disclosed. The extent to which
the presented information is coloured varies, however (Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; Douglas and Meijer 2016). Notably,
facts in the political realm are always interpreted and presented in a certain way (Stone 2002); neutral information
does not exist (Douglas and Meijer 2016). For example, governments can present all steps and communication with
inspectees online for each restaurant in a specific city, or disclose solely the names of violators of a hygiene law. Col-
our does not necessarily concern a purposeful intention to cover or hide information; rather, it addresses the con-
sciously or unconsciously invoked overtone and connotation of performance information.
Third, the usability of performance information differs. The advent of information and communication technolo-
gies means that anyone can read government information anytime, but the information is not necessarily understand-
able and usable by all actors. Disclosed information may be usable by experts but not by laypeople, or vice versa.
Meijer and Homburg (2009) describe how the Danish National Veterinary and Food Inspectorate places happy or sad
smiley faces on the door of restaurants and on their own website because they are simple and easy to interpret. This
system is specifically targeted at laypeople, but it may not be very useful to experts who want details about food
quality.
Finally, besides the amount of transparent information, the type of information that governments disclose can
also vary. This study specifically addresses transparency about regulatory performance information. One of the core
tasks of regulators is to enforce rules and regulations and, ultimately, limit social risks (Ayres and Braithwaite 1994;
Levi-Faur 2011; Baldwin et al. 2012). Therefore, regulatory performance information concerns data about the ways
inspectees comply with rules and regulations, and about assessing social risks. Notably, performance remains a con-
tested concept and needs conceptual clarification (Boyne 2002, 2006; Andersen et al. 2016). This study focuses spe-
cifically on regulatory performance, which is defined as governments' effectiveness in achieving inspectees'
compliance with public rules and regulations and in assessing social risks.
2.1 | Hypothesized effects of government transparency on regulatory performance
We hypothesize both a direct and an indirect effect of transparency on regulatory performance. Figure 1 shows the
conceptual model underpinning this study. All core variables are based on the perceptions of street-level inspectors.
The model shows that inspectors' perceived government transparency is expected to impact perceived regulatory
performance directly. Because theories on capture and responsive regulation emphasize that relational distance
between inspectors and inspectees plays an important role (Ayres and Braithwaite 1994; Hood et al. 1999; Mascini
and Van Wijk 2009; Black 2010), it is hypothesized that the relation between government transparency and regula-
tory performance is also mediated by perceived relational distance. The remainder of this section addresses the vari-
ables and relationships in the conceptual model.
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2.1.1 | Direct effect
Scholars frequently question whether transparency is the ‘golden tool in policy making’ (de Fine Licht 2014, p. 362).
Although transparency is often positively associated with performance for a range of different reasons, such as
reducing corruption and enhancing financial efficiency and accountability (Hood 2007; Cucciniello et al. 2017), the
pros and cons of transparency are contested and results are mixed (see Hood and Heald 2006; Fung et al. 2007;
Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; de Fine Licht 2014; Cucciniello et al. 2017; Porumbescu et al. 2017). These mixed
results are, however, almost solely based on studies addressing the effects of transparency on citizens (see
Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017), for example, effects of transparency on citizens' trust in
government, their perceived government legitimacy and their voice behaviour (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017). None
of these transparency studies, however, are—to the authors' knowledge—based on the perspective and insights of
street-level bureaucrats.
A notable exception is the recent work by de Boer et al. (2018). De Boer et al. (2018) studied the effect of per-
ceived government transparency on the perceived resistance of inspectees by inspectors and their enforcement style
during face-to-face encounters with inspectees. De Boer et al. (2018) found that when regulators disclose more per-
formance information, inspectors experience less resistance from inspectees during face-to-face interactions. They
explain this result by suggesting that inspectors actually see government transparency as an effective instrument to
enhance compliance and assess social risks. In this line of reasoning, Meijer and Homburg (2009) studied government
transparency explicitly within the regulation sector. They argue that, under certain conditions, transparency practices
can, indeed, contribute to the minimization of social risks. In sum, inspectors take the view that government transpar-
ency reduces resistance of inspectees (de Boer et al. 2018) and thus contributes positively to ensuring compliance
and assessing social risks (Meijer and Homburg 2009; de Boer et al. 2018). It is, therefore, expected that transparency
will be perceived by inspectors as enhancing regulatory performance. The first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1: Perceived government transparency has a positive effect on perceived regulatory performance
2.1.2 | Indirect effect via perceived relational distance
We do not expect the direct effect to fully explain the hypothesized relationship between perceived transparency
and perceived regulatory performance. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between per-
ceived government transparency and regulatory performance, we investigate an indirect effect. We focus on an
often-discussed but under-researched element in effective regulation at the street level, namely relational distance
between inspector and inspectee (Hawkins 1984; Hood et al. 1999; Ashworth et al. 2002; Black 2010; Baldwin
et al. 2012; Lodge and Wegrich 2012).
H1Perceived government 
transparency
H2a/b
Perceived regulatory 
performance
Perceived relational 
distance
FIGURE 1 Conceptual model
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Relational distance concerns the degree to which the inspector and the inspectee participate in each other's (pro-
fessional) lives (see Boyne et al. 2002; Baldwin et al. 2012). Relational distance may have profound implications for
regulatory performance. Indeed, Black (2010) argues that intimacy breeds partnership. To illustrate, the intimacy of
small relational distance may help inspectors to better understand the inspectee and be responsive (Ayres and
Braithwaite 1994), as well as facilitate trust between inspectors and inspectees. According to Pautz (2009) and Pautz
and Wamsley (2012), a trusting relation between inspector and inspectee can encourage inspectees' cooperation. To
put it differently, small relational distance may benefit regulatory performance because it allows inspectors to be
responsive and encourage inspectees towards more compliant behaviour (Ayres and Braithwaite 1994). Neverthe-
less, the unintended consequences of being responsive while also punishing wrongdoers and (re)building trust pre-
sent difficulties for inspectors in practice (Mascini and Van Wijk 2009).
Hood et al. (1999) argue that, in intimate relationships, there is a chance of inspectors sympathizing with their
inspectees and becoming allies. In other words, small relational distance could also hinder regulatory performance
because it may result in capture. Capture occurs when inspectors ‘go native’ and identify too much with the business
organizations with which they interact (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; James 2000). The perceived relational distance
between inspectors and inspectees, ultimately, becomes too low (see Ashworth et al. 2002; Baldwin et al. 2012).
Capture undermines regulatory performance because it clouds inspectors' independent judgement and, thus, the
information collected about inspectees' regulatory performance (Ashworth et al. 2002). In essence, inspectors must
juggle between cooperation and persuasion while ensuring that they are not getting too close to inspectees and, ulti-
mately, getting captured.
Relational distance consists of two dimensions, namely a perceived and a factual one. First, the factual dimension
concerns the frequency of face-to-face interactions between an inspector and inspectee (see Boyne et al. 2002;
Baldwin et al. 2012). Factual relational distance is largely beyond the control of inspectors themselves. Even though
inspectors as street-level bureaucrats have a certain discretion (Lipsky 2010), organizational boundaries and regula-
tory structures largely determine how often certain groups of inspectees are to be inspected (see Ayres and
Braithwaite 1994; May and Burby 1998; Sparrow 2000; Baldwin et al. 2012). For instance, in risk-based regulation
regimes certain ‘at-risk’ groups are identified that are more likely to non-comply. These groups are then set to more
frequent inspection visits than non-risk groups (Black 2006; Rothstein et al. 2006; Baldwin and Black 2008). Second,
the perceived dimension concerns the experienced intimacy between an inspector and inspectee. This intimacy
builds and evolves during the face-to-face inspection visits of inspectors with inspectees. Perceived relational dis-
tance is, thus, shaped through the way inspectors behave and interact with inspectees (see Pautz and Wamsley
2012; Etienne 2013). Both dimensions of relational distance together make up the total relational distance between
an inspector and an inspectee.
Factual and perceived relational distance are interrelated. To illustrate, when the frequency of face-to-face inter-
actions between an inspector and inspectee is high (i.e., small factual relational distance), inspectors physically meet
inspectees and have the opportunity to build an intimate relationship (i.e., small perceived relational distance) and
almost become ‘insiders’. When the frequency of interactions is low (i.e., high factual relational distance), inspectors
cannot build such a close relationship simply because they do not interact with the inspectee often. Intimacy
between inspector and inspectee cannot evolve and inspectors remain ‘outsiders’ (Boyne et al. 2002; Baldwin
et al. 2012; Pautz and Wamsley 2012; Etienne 2013).
In this line of reasoning, this study primarily investigates the role of perceived relational distance because a gov-
ernmental organization's decision to make information about compliance transparent and public may have conse-
quences for the perceived relational distance between inspectors and inspectees, but not for the factual relational
distance. When an inspector perceives government transparency to be substantial this may have implications for
their level of intimacy between inspector and inspectee (i.e., perceived relational distance) because their relationship
becomes more visible (see de Boer et al. 2018), but not for the frequency of interactions (i.e., factual relational dis-
tance) since this is mostly beyond the control of inspectors and is predetermined by organizational structures (see
Ayres and Braithwaite 1994; May and Burby 1998; Sparrow 2000; Baldwin et al. 2012).
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If information is disclosed, external stakeholders become monitors in the background of the intimate relationship
between inspectors and inspectees (de Boer et al. 2018). Ultimately, this brings the relationship into the public
sphere and, therefore, the relationship becomes less intimate (see Black 2010) and, in turn, the perceived relational
distance becomes larger. Because of the difficulties that inspectors face while being responsive and controlling for
the unintended consequences during face-to-face interactions (Mascini and Van Wijk 2009), the potential hindrance
of capture (Hood et al. 1999) to regulatory performance is expected to outweigh the potential benefits of being able
to persuade inspectees towards more compliance (see Ayres & Braithwaite 1994). In other words, it is expected that
inspectors will perceive the growing perceived relational distance to be beneficial for regulatory performance
because it limits their struggle with becoming captured.
In addition, as we mentioned before, factual relational distance and perceived relational distance are interrelated.
We therefore expect perceived relational distance to work differently for inspectors in environments with large and
small factual relational distance from inspectees. For inspectors in environments with small factual relational distance,
perceived relational distance will play an important role in enforcement at the street level (see Pautz and Wamsley
2012; Etienne 2013). These inspectors must, as we mentioned above, juggle being responsive while not getting too
close and being captured (see Ayres and Braithwaite 1994; Hood et al. 1999). On the other hand, for inspectors who
enforce policies in street-level environments where the factual relational distance is large, the relationship with the
inspectee will matter much less in their day-to-day work (see Boyne et al. 2002; Baldwin et al. 2012) simply because
they do not meet inspectees often or more than once. In sum, when the factual relational distance is small, inspectors
must deal with the implications of their intimate relationship with inspectees for regulatory performance. However,
when the factual relational distance is large inspectors do not face the consequences of an intimate relationship with
inspectees because it is not present in the first place. Our final hypotheses, therefore, read as follows:
H2a: In a division where factual relational distance is large, perceived relational distance does not
mediate a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory
performance.
H2b: In a division where factual relational distance is small, perceived relational distance does mediate
a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance.
3 | METHOD
This research was carried out at the NVWA. The NVWA is among the largest inspectorates in the Netherlands. Its
core task is to ensure compliance with rules and regulations concerning public safety, public health, and animal wel-
fare. Moreover, the NVWA is in the process of developing and implementing ways of disclosing performance infor-
mation about compliance performance of the businesses that it regulates. Furthermore, responsiveness and
relational distance are prominent topics in the NVWA's enforcement strategy (Mascini and Van Wijk 2009; Van
Rooij-van den Bosch et al. 2015). NVWA inspectors conduct face-to-face inspection visits based on performance cri-
teria. For some sectors, business organizations' performance on several of these criteria is made available to the pub-
lic on the NVWA website or via a mobile application.
NVWA inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats because they implement public policies with autonomy
and room to manoeuvre using their discretion (Lipsky 2010). Inspectors deliver not only public services—like social
workers or physicians—but also obligations, because they set out to punish wrongdoers (Sparrow 2000); this makes
them especially powerful (Raaphorst 2018). They are particularly suitable for studying the influence of relational dis-
tance, as they often interact with a heterogeneous clientele—such as powerful corporations—and often have
repeated interactions with their inspectees (Braithwaite 2003; Nielsen 2015).
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3.1 | Data
Between October and November 2016, an online survey was distributed among NVWA inspectors. All respondents
were informed by email about the research and assured full anonymity and confidentiality of their answers. The
NVWA consists of five divisions, an advisory board, and a board of directors. The sample frame consists of all inspec-
tors working for two divisions (n = 804), namely, Veterinary & Import (n = 406) and Consumer & Safety (n = 398).
These two divisions were chosen because in Veterinary & Import there is a high frequency of interactions between
inspectors and business owners and in Consumer & Safety there is a low frequency. Thus, we could compare inspec-
tors with low levels and high levels of relational distance vis-à-vis inspectees. Experts from the NVWA confirmed
that these divisions differed in terms of relational distance between inspectors and inspectees. A complete overview
of the departments within each division can be found in Table 1.
New scales are used in this study. These were developed and validated using expert interviews (n = 11). The
experts were inspectors from the divisions Consumer & Safety (n = 4) and Veterinary & Import (n = 2) and a senior
staff committee including middle and upper management (n = 5). The items were revised in light of the feedback
from the expert interviews, and the survey was distributed after the final set was approved to suit the context of
street-level bureaucrats and their day-to-day enforcement (see also de Boer, 2018; de Boer et al., 2018).
A total of 466 inspectors filled in the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 58.0 per cent. The number of
respondents from Consumer & Safety was 221, and 245 from Veterinary & Import. Because they filled in less than
50 per cent of the questions, 123 respondents were omitted from the analyses, resulting in a total sample of
343 respondents. Of these, 168 were from Consumer & Safety and 175 from Veterinary & Import. The total sample
consists of 69.1 per cent male, 30.3 per cent female, and 0.6 per cent other. Respondents were between 23 and
73 years old (M = 49.7, SD = 10.78). Their work experience ranged between 1 and 40 years (M = 15.9, SD = 10.77).
Table 2 gives an overview of the characteristics of the two samples and the actual population. The total sample is
representative of the total population. Only work experience is slightly lower in the sample than in the total popula-
tion (M = 19.9 years). This slight difference in years' work experience is present in both samples (M = 23.8 and 16.0,
TABLE 1 Departments within the divisions Veterinary & Import and Consumer & Safety
Division Department
Veterinary & Import Veterinary 1
Veterinary 2
Import
Consumer & Safety Catering industry
Food safety & industrial production
Sustainability, food safety, and EU subsidy
Product safety (excluding laboratory)
TABLE 2 Sample and population characteristics
Consumer & Safety (n = 168) Veterinary & Import (n = 175) Total (n = 343)
Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population
Age (M) 49.2 48.5 50.2 49.0 49.7 48.8
Years' work experience (M) 18.6 23.8 13.4 16.0 15.9 19.9
Female (%) 24.6 28.1 35.4 40.2 30.3 29.0
Male (%) 74.3 71.9 64.2 59.9 69.7 71.0
Other sex (%) 1.2 – 0 – 0.6 –
Note: No data are available on other sexes for the total population.
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respectively). Also, women are slightly under- and men overrepresented in both samples. This should be considered
when the findings are being interpreted.
3.2 | Measures
The three key variables in this study are: perceived government transparency, perceived regulatory performance, and
perceived relational distance.
Perceived government transparency: Building on Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) and Douglas and Meijer (2016), the
focus is on the perceived amount of performance information made available by governments to other stakeholders.
The amount of performance information disclosed is based on the three criteria mentioned earlier, namely (1) com-
pleteness, (2) colouring, and (3) usability (Grimmelikhuijsen 2012; Douglas and Meijer 2016). Two items were formu-
lated for each criterion. Examples of items included are: ‘I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA
discloses as detailed’ (completeness); ‘shedding light on all aspects of an inspection’ (colouring); and ‘understandable
for non-experts’ (usability). Using exploratory factor analysis, it was found that the three criteria did not form one fac-
tor, but two. The third criterion—usability—formed a separate factor. Usability was, however, measured by only two
items and was therefore omitted from further analysis. The four items that remained formed a reliable measure for
perceived government transparency (ω = .88). McDonald's omega is reported and not Cronbach's alpha; Cronbach's
alpha has been criticized because it is prone to over- and underestimation (Sijtsma 2009).
Perceived regulatory performance: The core tasks of the government body that employs the inspectors in this
study, the NVWA, were used to develop a measure of regulatory performance. The NVWA has two core tasks in
which the inspectors are involved. First, enforcement entails all proceedings that are geared towards influencing
compliance behaviour. Second, risk assessment concerns judgements of societal dangers (Nederlandse Voedsel- en
Warenautoriteit 2015). For each core task, two items were formulated. To illustrate, an item included is: ‘My division
is successful in … tracing violations of rules and regulations’ (enforcement). The first two core tasks formed a reliable
measure of perceived regulatory performance (ω = .85).
Perceived relational distance: Part of the relational distance index (Hess 2003) was used to measure the way
inspectors perceive the relational distance between themselves and business organizations. Hess (2003) describes
three tactics that people can use to distance themselves, namely, (1) avoidance, (2) disengagement, and (3) cognitive
dissociation. The first tactic was not used to operationalize relational distance, as business organizations cannot avoid
street-level bureaucrats during face-to-face inspections. This tactic is, therefore, not realistic or suitable for the con-
text of this study. Disengagement entails individuals' efforts to disengage from those with whom they are interacting.
Cognitive dissociation ‘refers to changing perceptions about the relationship and the meaning of people's actions in
an effort to perceive less association in the relationship’ (Hess 2003, p. 203). For both disengagement and cognitive
dissociation, two items were created. These included, among others, ‘When I talk to the inspectee, I do not mention
personal subjects’ (disengagement) and ‘In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a
clear distinction between myself and them.’
The exploratory factor analysis and reliability statistics showed that the four items did not form a reliable scale.
Dropping items did not result in a reliable scale either (Field et al. 2012). Therefore, it was decided to use one item
only. Out of the four items, the item ‘In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear
distinction between myself and them’ was chosen because it is the least ambiguous and the least open to multiple
interpretations. In addition, this item measures cognitive dissociation, and this fits well with the focus on perceptions
in this research (Hess 2003).
Controls: Sex, age, and work experience were included as demographic control variables. Trust in government
transparency was also included and measured using one item, namely, ‘I think that disclosing inspection results will
increase the compliance of inspectees.’ Controlling for the extent of street-level bureaucrats' trust in the effect of
the instrument is important, because it may relate to the way they perceive the overall effectiveness of government
transparency and regulatory performance. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all items.
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3.3 | Common source bias: design—and ex-post remedies
Common source bias is a potential limitation for survey research using perceptional data (Podsakoff et al. 2012;
George and Pandey 2017). Design remedies are best suited to limiting common source bias, and therefore several
measures were taken (Podsakoff et al. 2012). First, the importance of this research was communicated by the
researchers but also by the NVWA management and team leaders to ensure support and careful answering of the
questions by the respondents. There was, thus, substantive organizational support. Second, respondents were
informed that the NVWA management and they themselves would get a report; this served as an incentive to partici-
pate. Third, all items of the multi-item questions were coloured in a different shade of grey to facilitate respondents'
focus while answering the questionnaire. Finally, as already mentioned, the questionnaire was tested among experts.
This enhances face validity (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; Podsakoff et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2012; Podsakoff et al. 2012;
George and Pandey 2017).
Although post-hoc statistical remedies have been criticized substantially (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff
et al. 2012; George and Pandey 2017), they are a useful indication of whether common source bias influences model
estimation. Two tests were conducted. First, the independent, dependent, and mediating variables were all loaded on
one latent factor for a confirmatory factor analysis (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The comparative fit index (CFI), the
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root square
residual (SRMR) were used to assess the fit of the models. Cut-off criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90
(moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05, and
≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu and Bentler 1999). The fit of the model for the total sample is very poor (χ2 = 339.021,
df = 27) with CFI = .665, TLI = .553, RMSEA = .232, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .152. When the sample is split,
the model fits remain poor (χ2 = 187.580, df = 27, CFI = .615, TLI = .486, RMSEA = .226, PCLOSE = .000, and
SRMR = .161; and χ2 = 174.552, df = 27, CFI = .714, TLI = .618, RMSEA = .238, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .138,
respectively).
Second, all individual items of the variables were loaded on a first-order factor as well as on their own latent con-
structs. This is known as a common latent factor model estimation (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The differences in χ2
between the conceptual and the common latent factor model were tested in the total sample using ANOVA. The
ANOVA is not statistically significant (χ2 difference = 1.182, df = 1, p = .277). For both samples separately, the
ANOVA tests are not statistically significant either (χ2 difference = 1.925, p = .1653; and χ2 difference = 0.222,
p = .6377, respectively). Adding a common latent factor to the conceptualized model did not result in a better fit. It
can, therefore, be concluded that there is no indication that common source bias impacts the findings in this study.
4 | FINDINGS
The statistical program R was used to determine the impact of perceived government transparency on perceived reg-
ulatory performance, as well as the extent to which relational distance mediates this relationship. The packages
‘lavaan’ (Rosseel 2011), ‘psych’ (Revelle 2014), and ‘semTools’ (Pornprasertmanit et al. 2013) were used. Our data
vary slightly from normality, and therefore the parameters in our models were estimated using the Satorra-Bentler
correction (Satorra and Bentler 1994).
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the independent, dependent, mediating,
and control variables. Perceived government transparency correlates positively with perceived regulatory perfor-
mance (.37) as well as perceived relational distance (.16). Likewise, perceived relational distance correlates positively
with perceived regulatory performance (. 22). Both government transparency and regulatory performance correlate
positively with the control variable trust in government transparency (.18 and .18, respectively). Perceived regulatory
performance also correlates positively with the sex dummy (1 = Female) (.13). Perceived relational distance correlates
with none of the control variables. All significant correlations were included in the estimation of the parameters.
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Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to further study the relationship between the core variables in this
study because of the latent nature of both the independent and the dependent variables and the multiple regression
paths (Kline 2015). The sample was split, as we were interested in a comparison between the division with a low fre-
quency of interactions (Consumer & Safety) and the division with a high frequency of interactions (Veterinary &
Import) between street-level bureaucrats and businesses. For both samples, the same model was used for parameter
estimation. Table 4 shows the model fit statistics for both models; the fit is good in each case.
The results of the hypothesized relations are displayed in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 5. The first hypothesis con-
cerns the direct relation between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory performance. More
TABLE 3 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of total sample (n = 343)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Perceived government transparency 5.45 1.76 1
2 Perceived regulatory performance 6.77 1.50 0.37*** 1
3 Perceived relational distance 5.07 2.45 0.16** 0.22*** 1
4 Age 49.67 10.78 0.08 −0.01 0.08 1
5 Years' work experience 15.92 10.77 −0.05 0.03 0.04 0.60*** 1
6 Sex (1 = Female) 0.30 0.46 −0.03 0.13** −0.04 −0.43*** −0.31*** 1
7 Sex (1 = Other) 0.01 0.08 −0.01 −0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.05 −0.05 1
8 Trust in government transparency 7.33 1.99 0.18** 0.18** −0.01 0.00 0.03 −0.05 −0.01 1
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01.
TABLE 4 Model fit statistics
Model 1 (Consumer & Safety) Model 2 (Veterinary & Import)
χ2 63.618 43.579
df 41 41
CFI .949 .995
TLI .932 .994
RMSEA .066 .021
PCLOSE .225 .880
SRMR .060 .066
Perceived government 
transparency
.245**
Sex (1 = Female)Trust in government transparency
-.004
Perceived regulatory 
performance
Perceived relational 
distance
-.038 -.114
.110.099
FIGURE 2 Graphical representation SEM result model 1 (Consumer & Safety division)
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specifically, it predicts that inspectors' perceptions of government transparency and regulatory performance are posi-
tively related. The standardized regression coefficients for both models confirm this expectation. For both the
inspectors who have few interactions with the same inspectees (model 1 Consumer & Safety) and the inspectors
who have frequent and recurrent interactions (model 2 Veterinary & Import), it is found that when their perception
of government transparency rises, so does their perceived regulatory performance (z = 2.305, st.B = .245, SE = .054,
p = .021; and z = 3.516, st.B = .419, SE = .077, p = .000, respectively). The effect is strongest for the inspectors with
a high frequency of contact (model 2).
The second set of hypotheses concerns the mediating effect of perceived relational distance. On the one hand,
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the effect will not be mediated by perceived relational distance for inspectors working
for divisions where the recurrence and occurrence of contact with inspectees is low (model 1). Hypothesis 2b, on the
other hand, expects that for inspectors working at divisions where the frequency of face-to-face interactions with
Perceived government 
transparency
.419***
Sex (1 = Female)Trust in government transparency
.083**
Perceived regulatory 
performance
Perceived relational 
distance
.368*** .227**
.112.213**
FIGURE 3 Graphical representation SEM result model 2 (Veterinary & Import division)
TABLE 5 Results SEM
Model 1 (Consumer & Safety) Model 2 (Veterinary & Import)
Perceived
regulatory
performance
Perceived
relational
distance
Perceived
regulatory
performance
Perceived
relational
distance
z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B z St.SE St.B
Direct effect
Perceived government
transparency
2.305 0.054 0.245** −0.417 0.116 −0.038 3.516 0.077 0.419*** 3.621 0.132 0.368***
Perceived relational
distance
1.147 0.040 0.114 – – – 2.625 0.043 0.227** – – –
Indirect effect
via perceived
relational distance
Perceived government
transparency
−0.409 0.005 −0.004 – – – 2.265 0.024 0.083** – – –
Total effect
Perceived government
transparency
2.306 0.053 0.240** – – – 3.870 0.084 0.502*** – – –
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01.
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inspectees is high, the relational distance between them will mediate the effect between perceived government
transparency and perceived regulatory performance (model 2). Both Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b are confirmed.
Model 1 shows, indeed, that the relationship between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory
performance is not explained by perceived relational distance (z = −.409, st.B = −.004, SE = .005, p = .681).
In addition, this study finds a statistically significant total indirect effect for model 2 (z = −2.265, st.B = .024,
SE = .083, p = .023). When the inspectors' perceptions of government transparency rise, so does their perceived
relational distance and, consequently, also their perception of regulatory performance. When we examine this rela-
tionship more closely, a statistically significant relationship is found between perceived government transparency
and relational distance (z = 3.621, st.B = .368, SE = .132, p = .000) as well as between relational distance and regula-
tory performance (z = 2.625, st.B = .227, SE = .043, p = .009). In sum, the relationship between perceived govern-
ment transparency and perceived regulatory performance of inspectors working in a division where the frequency of
contact between themselves and inspectees is low can be explained by their perceived relational distance.
5 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This study investigates the extent to which inspectors, who are classic street-level bureaucrats, perceive an impact of
government transparency on regulatory performance and how this is mediated through perceived relational distance
between the inspector and the inspectee. Our findings contribute to the existing literature in three ways.
First, transparency scholars often stress that the pros and cons of government transparency are contested
(Hood and Heald 2006; Fung et al. 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013; de Fine Licht 2014; Van Dooren and Van de
Walle 2016; Cucciniello et al. 2017). The transparency debate, however, lacks a street-level perspective (see de Boer
et al. 2018). Our findings indicate that, according to street-level bureaucrats, government transparency does contrib-
ute to good performance of their division. More specifically, the more street-level bureaucrats perceive that regula-
tory performance regarding business organizations' compliance is made transparent, the more they perceive that
their division is performing well in fulfilling its public tasks such as tracing rule violations and monitoring risks.
Second, one reason why street-level bureaucrats perceive regulatory performance as improving when more perfor-
mance information is made transparent is because of an indirect effect through increased perceived relational distance.
The results show that, for street-level bureaucrats working in divisions where the factual relational distance is small
(i.e., frequency of interactions with business owners is high), there is not only a direct positive effect of increased
perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance, but also an indirect effect: increases in per-
ceived government transparency lead to larger perceived relational distance, which, consequently, increases perceived
regulatory performance. This indirect effect does not occur in divisions where the factual relational distance is large
(i.e., the interaction between street-level bureaucrats and business owners is low). In other words, in divisions with a lot
of face-to-face encounters, the perceived mechanism through which regulatory performance is realized changes when
the level of transparency increases.
In such divisions, perceived regulatory performance becomes less dependent on the close relationship between
the street-level bureaucrat and the inspectee, and more dependent on public scrutiny by other stakeholders. This
points to a shift from a more relational regulatory procedure to a more public regulatory process. Interestingly,
although scholars investigating the relationship and interactions between street-level bureaucrats and their clients
have shown that fostering trust and a cooperative relation may be beneficial for delivering and implementing public
policies (Pautz 2009; Pautz and Wamsley 2012), our findings indicate that, according to street-level bureaucrats' per-
ceptions, the shift towards more transparent public procedures and less intimate relationships enhances regulators'
ability to perform. Future research is needed to assess whether these findings also hold among other stakeholders
such as public managers or business owners. A cross-sector approach using, for instance, experiments may be espe-
cially fruitful (see de Fine Licht 2014; Porumbescu et al. 2017).
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Finally, the results contribute to the literature on regulatory capture (James 2000; Mitnick 2011; Baldwin
et al. 2012; Carpenter and Moss 2013) by providing empirical confirmation for theory stating that, when there is little
contact between street-level bureaucrats and business owners, street-level bureaucrats do not go native, because
the factual relational distance is high and, consequently, the regulated industry does not control or capture govern-
ment agencies (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; James 2000; Mitnick 2011). When there is a lot of contact, street-level
bureaucrats run the risk of going native because the factual relational distance is small and they, in turn, get captured.
The findings may indicate that street-level bureaucrats feel pressure from their clients and are not able to create a
desirable perceived relational distance themselves but need institutional arrangements—such as government
transparency—to remain at a distance. In sum, this research indicates that increasing government transparency helps
to limit regulatory capture because it increases perceived relational distance (see Carpenter and Moss 2013). Future
research is needed to understand the implications of increasing relational distance at the street level, for instance, in
terms of bureaucrats' engagement in policy design (see Lavee et al. 2018), policy alienation (see Van Engen
et al. 2016) and enforcement style (see de Boer et al. 2018; de Boer 2018).
As with any research, there are methodological limitations to this study. First, surveys collecting data from
respondents at a single point in time have been criticized because of the risk of common source bias (Podsakoff and
Organ 1986; Meier and O'Toole 2012). Risking common source bias was unavoidable, as we are interested in percep-
tions, but common source bias was limited through design remedies. The ex-post remedies conducted did not indicate
common source bias in our findings (George and Pandey 2017). Second, it is not possible to make causal inferences
because our data are cross-sectional. Future studies, for instance using experimental methods, could be used to fur-
ther distil the mechanisms identified in this research. Third, relational distance is only measured by one item since
the intended four-item scale did not pass reliability thresholds (Field et al. 2012). Relational distance may be more
complex and nuanced than the single item used in this study. Future research should pay attention to continuing the
development and validation of a reliable measurement scale for relational distance.
Finally, this research has theoretical limitations. First, it addresses a specific type of street-level bureaucrat, namely,
inspectors, in a specific context, the Netherlands. Inspectors are similar to other street-level bureaucrats. For instance,
they enforce policies, just as for example police officers. Inspectors may, however, also differ from other street-level
bureaucrats. Second, the Dutch context may differ from other countries, for example because of specific features of
Dutch culture or of the Dutch regulatory system. More research is needed to determine which contextual features may
be of influence and whether our results can be generalized to other countries and sectors. Future research with cross-
sector and cross-national comparisons will help to assess how other street-level bureaucrats view the impact of govern-
ment transparency on regulatory performance in other sectors and countries across the globe.
Third, this study addresses the impact of government transparency on regulatory performance and assesses
whether relational distance matters. The transparency of the bureaucrat–inspectee encounter may, however, also
influence their relational distance and have implications for how street-level bureaucrats perceive the impact of gov-
ernment transparency. Future research could compare the impact of government transparency for bureaucrat–
inspectee encounters which are public (e.g., police arrests) and not public (e.g., slaughterhouse inspection visits).
Finally, and most importantly, this study is unable to explain how street-level bureaucrats interpret the effects of
government transparency on their relational distance with inspectees and regulatory performance. Future research
using qualitative methods, such as interviews, will be crucial to distil the interpretations of street-level bureaucrats
on how government transparency, relational distance and regulatory performance interact with one another.
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APPENDIX: Questionnaire items
TABLE A1
Variable Item Answer categories
Perceived government
transparency
I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as:
1. Complete
2. Detailed
3. Shedding light on all aspects of an inspection
4. Without judgement
Scale from 1 to 10
Perceived regulatory
performance
My division is successful in:
1. Tracing violations of rules and regulations
2. Ensuring companies comply with rules and regulations
3. Monitoring risks for consumers
4. Reducing risks for consumers
Scale from 1 to 10
Perceived relational
distance
In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees
in order to make a clear distinction between
myself and them
Scale from 1 to 10
Trust in government
transparency
I think that disclosing inspection results will increase
the compliance of inspectees
Scale from 1 to 10
Sex What is your sex? 3 answer categories
(male; female; other)
Years' work experience How many years have you been employed as an inspector
at the NVWA (or predecessors of the NVWA)?
Filled in by respondent
in numbers
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